University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1999

Problem framing :: a remedy for indecisiveness in decisionmaking?
Mary Seburn
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses

Seburn, Mary, "Problem framing :: a remedy for indecisiveness in decision-making?" (1999). Masters
Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2344.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2344

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass
Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

PROBLEM FRAMING: A REMEDY FOR INDECISIVENESS
IN DECISIONMAKING?

A Thesis Presented
by

MARY SEBURN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
September 1999

Psychology

PROBLEM FRAMING: A REMEDY FOR INDECISIVENESS
IN DECISIONMAKING?

A Thesis Presented

by

MARY SEBURN

Approved as to style and content by:

Icek Aizen,

Chair

Susan Fiske, Member

James Averill, Member

Melinda Novak, Department Head
Department of Psychology

DEDICATION
I

dedicate this, and everything, to Anji

hard because

I

-

who worked

did and learned to make her own
linguini.

,

ABSTRACT
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Difficulty and conflict results in indecisiveness
often causing an impasse in the decision-making
process.
Two decision problems were presented under

a

positive,

negative or neutral frame under conditions of cognitive
load and no cognitive load.

After making their decision

participants rated it for difficulty, completed

a

belief

elicitation and recognition task, and completed measures of
indecisiveness and need for cognition.

Introducing

framing bias in the option evaluation stage of

a

a

decision

problem slightly reduced indecisiveness, making the
decision less difficult to resolve.
also reduced indecisiveness.

and provides evidence that

a

and consider all features of

Adding cognitive load

The current research suggests

predisposition to attend to
a

problem correlates with

indecisiveness and that indecisiveness can be reduced by
contextual factors.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

What happens when decisions are difficult
to make?

Frequently, when people are making decisions
they become

uncertain and unable to chose between options.
Across

a

variety of situations, some individuals encounter
difficulties infrequently while others experience

a

more

global tendency to experience difficulty when making
decisions.

Indecision often causes an impasse in the

decision making process,

a

common impediment to decision

making that can result in conflict and distress (Ferrari
Dovidio,

1997;

Harriott,

Ferrari

&

Dovidio,

&

1996).

Ambivalence and uncertainty intrinsic to indecision
often result from an approach avoidance conflict (Lewin,
1935,

1938)

.

As an individual advances towards making

a

decision, the positive and negative valences of the options

become stronger.

Lewin postulated that as psychological

time to the decision decreases, the avoidance tendency

becomes stronger at
tendency.

a

faster rate than the approach

As a result,

the avoidance tendency eventually

overcomes the approach tendency, repelling the decision-

maker away from the decision.

This conflict alternately

pulls the decision-maker in opposing directions, causing

indecisiveness and making the decision
difficult to
resolve.

This dilemma may be resolved by
increasing the

gradient of either the approach or the
avoidance tendency
until one eventually dominates over the
other and decides
the course of action.

Introducing

a

bias that makes either

positive or negative features of the problem
more salient
is one possible way to raise the gradient
of one tendency

enough to overcome the other.

This may resolve the

approach-avoidance conflict and reduce indecision.
The main concern of this research was to explore
ways
to reduce indecisiveness and the difficulty it creates in

decision-making.

Specifically,

whether the introduction of

a

I

was concerned with

contextual bias into

decision problem can reduce indecisiveness.

a

A biased

consideration of options may make positive or negative
features more salient, and therefore more accessible.

Alternatively,

a

bias could cause the decision-maker to

give more importance to either the positive or negative

qualities.

Specifically,

features inconsistent with the

bias may receive diminished attention while bias-consistent

features may receive increased salience and importance.
Thus,

anything that increases accessibility of certain

characteristics should direct

a

decision-maker toward

particular alternative and thus reduce indecision.

I

a

propose that biasing the decision-maker
will reduce
indecisiveness, and diminish the difficulty
often

experienced when making decisions.
that can bias accessibility,

There are many factors

salience,

and importance of

the options of a decision, but this
study focuses

specifically on the effects of problem framing.

The Effects of Framing on Decision

The outcome of
of factors:

a

decision can be affected by

the number of options

a

number

&

Schul,

1995),

(Shafir,

1993),

the

(Ganzach

the descriptiveness of the outcomes

level of risk associated with the outcomes

Miller,

1987;

Klihberger,

1995)

(Fagley

&

and even simply drawing

attention to missing but irrelevant information (Bastardi
Shafir,

1998)

.

Framing research has consistently shown

that the manner in which options are framed or worded

influences the outcome of decisions.

Framing effects

emerge when different wordings of the same problem result
in different decisions

Kuhberger,

(see Beike

1998 for reviews)

.

&

Sherman,

1998;

Although the actual

alternatives remain unchanged, people often make different
choices when the same alternatives are presented in

different ways.

For example,

framing options in terms of

&

gains is not equivalent to framing
the identical options in
terms of losses, and in fact, can
result in opposite

outcomes.

Srmrlar reversals of preference have
been shown

by framing options in terms of survival
vs. mortality
(e.g.,
vs.

lives lost vs. lives saved, live vs.
die),

success

failure, accept vs. reject, and award vs.
deny.

Frequently, these types of frames are broadly
categorized
as positive or negative frames.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) originally reported
framing effects in decision making.

Their participants

were more willing to accept risks when they evaluated

options in terms of costs, but avoided risks when the same

options were described in terms of benefits.

For example,

participants chose between two programs of intervention,
one worded as the saving of lives

(a

positive frame) and

the other worded as preventing the loss of lives

negative frame)
same,

(a

While the decision was factually the

.

decision-makers demonstrated risk aversion when the

options were framed in terms of gains, and risk taking when
the same options were reworded as losses.

This finding has

been widely replicated (Frisch,

Shanteau,

Harris,

Adams,

1996; Kuhberger,
1995; Takemura,

for null results)

.

1995,

1993,

1993;
1998;

Jou,

Kuhn,

but see Fagley

1997; Li
&

&

&

Miller,

1987

Tversky and Kahneman were the first to

s

demonstrate the implications of changing

a

problem's frame,

that the wording of the decision
problem could actually

reverse preferences for alternatives.

Shafir

(1993)

researched how framing effects alter the

outcomes of decision choices by framing

a

problem task as

one requiring either the acceptance of
options or the

rejection of options.

His problems involved a choice

between two alternatives; an "enriched" option
that

consisted of equal amounts of both positive and
negative
valence information, and an "impoverished" option

consisting of the same number of attributes all neutral in
valence.

He found that the enriched options were more

likely to be both accepted and rejected, presumably because
the decision makers were biased towards positive features

when the decision was framed as accepting and biased

towards negative features when the problems were framed in
terms of rejecting, and the enriched option had more of

each feature than did the impoverished option.

Shaf ir'

research again demonstrates that the wording of the

decision problem strongly influences the evaluation of the

problem's options.
Ganzach and Schul (1995) also investigated framing
effects.

They manipulated the quantity of information in

the options available to their participants and framed the

.

choice as Shafir had done, as accepting
or rejecting.

Their options all contained equal
numbers of positive and

negative traits differing only in number
of total traits.
Results from their research indicate that,
as the quantity
of information about an option increases,

so does the

likelihood of that option being both accepted
by

participants in

a

positive frame and rejected by

participants in

a

negative frame.

Researchers investigating framing effects have

accumulated

large body of evidence detailing the effects

a

of problem framing on decision outcomes.

Early research

showed clear and strong effects, while recent research has

produced smaller effects and occasionally inconsistent or
null results.

The early research in framing used

set of the same problems,

a

small

Kahneman and Tversky's Asian

Disease Problem most frequently.

Later researchers

developed new and different types of framing problems
(risky,

probilogical

,

goals,

those involving life vs. those

involving property, etc.) and various types of options
(risky,

enriched, vague, neutral, varying in number or

valence of features)
accept /re j ect

)

,

,

frames

(gain/loss, positive/negative,

and decision outcomes, or task (choosing

the correct option,

subjective judgments of options, choice

between two options, choice concerning

a

single option)

This increased heterogeneity of the
problems and frames

used in research may account in part
for the recent mixed
results.

In the present research,

I

used positive and

negative frames in problems described by
neutrally valenced
and enriched options varying in task;
one problem involved
a

decision concerning

required
I

a

a

single option, and the other

preference between two options.

suggest that problem framing manipulates the
outcome

of a decision by influencing the salience,

accessibility,

or perceived importance of certain features of

Framing

a

losing,

for example)

a

problem.

decision negatively (in terms of rejecting or
increases attention to and salience of

negative features, and decreases the salience of and

attention paid to positive features.

Likewise,

framing

a

decision positively (in terms of accepting or saving, for
example)

directs attention to and increases reliance on the

positive dimensions of the information relevant to the
problem.

This uneven weighting of the options makes either

positive or negative features more consequential in the
outcome of the decision; as
a

a

frame should reflect bias in

result,
a

decisions made under

direction consistent with

the frame.

Framing effects on decision outcomes can depend on

contextual differences in decision problems.

Many

.

contextual factors may inhibit or magnify
the effects of

problem framing.

Factors enhancing framing effects include

increasing the quantity of information provided
(Ganzach
Schul,

1995),

&

increasing the level of risk associated with

the available alternatives, and comparing
risky with

riskless options (Kiihberger, 1998).

Negative frames are

often more persuasive and result in larger frame
effects
than positive frames
Kuhberger,

1998;

(Fishbein, Ajzen,

Petty

&

Wegener,

&

1991,

McArdle,

1980;

1997).

Factors reducing or eliminating framing effects

include having to justify the decision (Miller

&

Fagley,

1991), providing decision-makers with a "causal schema" or

rationale for option ambiguity (Jou, Shanteau, &Harris,
1996),

and increasing decision-makers' responsibility for

their decisions
1994)

.

(Schoorman, Mayer,

Douglas

&

Hetrick,

Another factor that reduces the effects of decision

framing is personal relevance or involvement, which

increases the depth of message or argument processing
Petty

(Fazio,

1990;

effects

(see Takemura,

&

Cacioppo,
1993)

8

1986)

and inhibits framing

.

Cognitive Load and Framing

Distraction may interact with problem framing.
Decisions made under distracting conditions
(i.e.,

cognitive load)
effects.

should exhibit strengthened framing

Previous research examined cognitive load as

a

moderator to persuasion effectiveness and attribution
judgments
1976;

(Gilbert

Trope

&

&

Osborne,

Alfieri,

1989;

1997).

Petty,

Wells

&

Brock,

Results of these studies

indicated that individuals operating under time pressure,
distraction, or other load conditions are more likely to
rely on heuristics or contextual cues when making

evaluations or decisions.
Decision makers under cognitive load may show

decreased performance on

a

more effortful task (fully

considering all options) and increased reliance on

a

less

effortful task (utilizing an available contextual cue, such
as problem framing)

.

Imposing

a

cognitive load on

a

decision-maker should make the decision more difficult to
resolve and may actually increase the effects of problem
framing

9

The Effects of Framing on Inder.i

Framing effects can be used as

persuasion (Smith
(Dhar

Sherman,

&

&

Petty,

1996;

tool for increasing

a

Sanbonmatsu,

&

v^n^ ss

guiding consumer choice

1996),

Kardes

.gi

1993),

determining investment and research fund allocation
(Schoorman,

et

al„,

.

1994)

as well as directing the

inferences drawn during legal questioning (Beike
1998;

Heath

&

Tindale,

1994; Loftus,

1975).

&

Sherman,

Framing

effects can be used to increase compliance with medical
advice
&

(Johnson,

Thee,

Beach

&

Payne,

&

Bettman,

1988; Levin,

Schnittjer,

1988),

increase voting behavior (Greenwald, Carnot,

Young,

1987; Lavine,

et

.

al.,

1999)

and aid the

reconstruction of eyewitness recollection (Loftus, Miller,
&

Burns,

1978; Loftus

&

Palmer,

1974).

Another potential

and beneficial use for problem framing may be to decrease

indecisiveness in decision-making.

Research has shown that

problem framing biases decision-makers in predictable
directions but it has not been determined if framing
reduces indecision.

This is an important question to

answer especially considering the myriad of difficult

decisions people encounter on

a

daily basis.

can reduce indecision has many applications.

10

Anything that

.

The addition of a frame to

provide
upon.

a

a

difficult problem should

contextual bias for the decision-maker to
rely

An available bias should reduce the
conflict and

uncertainty of trying to decide between
equivalent outcomes
by directing the preferences of the
decision-maker in the

direction of the frame.

This may be enough to increase the

gradient of Levin's approach or avoidance tendencies
until
the one overcomes the other and decides the
course of

action.

Any decision reached by reliance on

a

simple

heuristic should be easier than decisions arrived at
through deliberate evaluation of all options.
frame provides such

a

bias.

Therefore,

framing

A problem
a

problem

in terms of positive or negative outcomes should result in

less indecision than facing the same problem without such
frame.

Adding

a

problem frame should lessen the difficulty

and ambiguity in decision-making and result in diminished

indecisiveness

Cognitive Load and Indecisiveness

In making difficult decisions;,

people should be more

likely to rely on anything that biases their attention and
reduces the conflict and difficulty.

distraction to

a

a

While introducing

decision problem increases the cognitive

11

effort required to resolve

a

problem,

it has not yet been

shown that cognitive load actually
increases the difficulty

reported in making the decision.

The imposition of

cognitive load should result in more difficulty
making the
decision.

If cognitive load makes decisions
more

difficult, then individuals making those decisions
should
be especially likely to rely on any available
biases.

Problem frame should interact with cognitive load,
such
that the decrease in indecisiveness resulting from
problem

framing would be especially strong for decision-makers

operating under distraction.

Individual Differences

Dispositional factors may make people more or less

susceptible to framing effects.

Increased framing effects

have been reported when decision makers are in neutral

moods rather than positive or negative moods (Hirt,
McDonald, Levine, Melton,

&

Martin,

1999)

and when research

participants are indifferent about the outcomes of the
decision (Frisch, 1993).

Additionally,

a

frame consistent

with one's activated self-schema tends to increase framing
effects

(Cacioppo,

Petty

&

Sidera,

1982)

.

Tordesillas and

Chaiken (1999) reported that high introspection decreased
12

.

information processing, which has been shown
to increased
framing effects for those participants

(Takemura,

1993).

Dispositional factors can decrease framing
effects as
well.

Tykocinski, Higgins, and Chaiken (1994)

reported

that self-discrepancy type determined frame
effectiveness;
for actual-ideal discrepant participants

was more effective, while

a

a

negative frame

positive frame was more

effective for actual-ought discrepant participants.

Being

high in need for cognition also inhibits the effects of

problem framing (Smith

Levin,

&

1996;

Smith,

&

Petty,

1996)

Dispositional Indecisiveness

Another factor that may influence the effectiveness of
frame is dispositional indecisiveness.

Some people

generally experience more difficulty making decisions than
others do.

Previous researchers have defined

indecisiveness as

a

when faced with

decision problem (Ferrari

1997;

Harriott,

a

proneness to hesitate or procrastinate

Ferrari

&

Dovidio,

1996).

&

Dovidio,

Indecisiveness

is generally explored within the context of various aspects

of mental health and personality variables

Shows,

1993)

.

(see Frost

&

The current research suggests instead that

13

indecisiveness is

a

measurable difference in the difficulty

with which people experience making decisions.
Some individuals may be predisposed to be
more

deliberate than others are.

This inclination would make

decisions more effortful and difficult.

Others,

may be inclined to focus more on one side of
For example,

a

however,

problem.

one may attend primarily to either the

negative or the positive features, to the neglect of the
other.

A dispositional bias that eliminates the need for

deliberation of inconsistent features should make it less
difficult to reach

a

decision.

If this inclination towards

indecisiveness were measured, those who are most decisive
should show more bias, and therefore report less difficulty
than those who are indecisive, show less bias, and report

more difficulty.

Additionally, those who are disposit ionally indecisive
should be more susceptible to biases inherent in the

decision-making context.

People who frequently encounter

difficulty in decision-making should readily seek out and
utilize ways to reduce the conflict.
and Dovidio

(1996)

Harriott,

Ferrari,

suggest that individuals who are high on

dispositional indecisiveness may be easily distracted and
influenced by situational cues.

Providing

a

problem frame

for individuals high in dispositional indecisiveness should

14

»

„

result in

a

greater reduction

m

situational indecisiveness

than providing the same frame for individuals
low in

dispositional indecisiveness

Need for Cognition

Individual differences in indecisiveness may be

related to Cacioppo and Petty'
cognition.

s

(1982)

concept of need for

They define need for cognition as the

propensity of an individual to pursue and enjoy thinking.
Individuals high in need for cognition presumably prefer to

deliberate all information before committing to

a

decision,

whereas those low in need for cognition may think about

decision features on

a

superficial level only, tending to

rely on heuristics or rules of thumb to guide their

choices

Need for cognition may or may not be related to

indecision and difficulty often encountered in decisionmakingo

Individuals low in need for cognition, who do not

think extensively about

a

problem may report less

indecision and difficulty making decisions than people high
in need for cognition who think extensively about every

alternative.

Alternatively, individuals who are high in

need for cognition may not perceive decision making as
15

.

difficult since they presumably enjoy the
extensive

deliberation given to decision-making.
Need for cognition may also interact with
the effects
of problem framing.

Individuals low in need for cognition

may be more susceptible to the effects of problem
framing.
Individuals who enjoy thinking may be less influenced
by

anything that biases their evaluation and reduces the

necessary deliberation of options.

Previous research has

reported that participants high in need for cognition were

unaffected by problem framing, while low need for cognition
participants showed expected framing effects (Smith
Levine,

1996;

Smith

&

Petty,

&

1996)

Alternatively, it is possible that individuals high
in need for cognition will be more susceptible to the

effects of framing.

Individuals who enjoy thinking are not

necessarily unbiased thinkers; they simply think more.

The

bias could be proportionate to the extent of deliberation

given a problem, resulting in more bias for those high in

need for cognition, and less bias for individuals low in
need for cognition.

Therefore, individual differences in

need for cognition may magnify or diminish the effects of

problem framing.
The concept of need for cognition seems relevant in

this context but could have varied results.
16

High need for

.

cognition could magnify framing effects if
increasing

problem deliberation amplifies framing imposed
bias.
the other hand,

On

if people who enjoy thinking are
less

susceptible to biases, as previous research
suggests, being
high in need for cognition could diminish
framing effects.
In addition,

differences in need for cognition may or may

not be related to differences in difficulty
experienced

when making decisions.

The inclusion of need for cognition

in the present research is exploratory in nature
because

individual differences in need for cognition may be

potentially relevant to current objectives.

Hypotheses

The present study examined the effects of problem framing
on indecisiveness

,

These effects were investigated under

distraction and with no distraction on individuals
differing in dispositional indecisiveness and need for
cognition

Decision

Replication of previous results was expected, indicted
by

a

main effect of frame on decision.
17

Two problems were

designed to test this,

a

course and

The course problem involved

depending on frame)

a

a

a

roommate problem.

decision to add (or drop,

hypothetical course and the roommate

problem required participants to decide which
of two
roommates varying in the number of features used
to

describe each they would accept (or reject, depending
on
frame)

as a roommate.

and Schul's

(1995)

Based on Shafir's

(1993)

and Ganzach

findings that participants were both

more likely to accept and reject "enriched" options and
options described by more features the enriched, or 9/9

person was expected to be both chosen most frequently in
the positive frame and rejected most frequently in the

negative frame.

Similarly,

for the course problem,

positively framed participants should add the course and
negatively framed participants should drop the course.
The effects of framing were expected to interact with

distraction,

increasing in strength when presented under

conditions of cognitive load.

Participants under cognitive

load in the positive frame should accept the 9/9 roommate

and add the course more than participants not under

cognitive load in the positive frame.

Conversely,

participants under cognitive load in the negative frame
should drop the course and reject the 9/9 roommate more

18

.

than participants not under cognitive
load in the negative
frame

Situational Indecisivenes s

A main effect of framing on was predicted
for

situational indecisiveness

„

Introducing

a

frame should

bias the evaluation of problem features and thus
decrease

indecisiveness.

There should also be evidence of

a

main

effect of cognitive load; individuals under cognitive
load

should report greater difficulty making decisions than

participants under no cognitive load.

A Frame x Cognitive

load interaction is also predicted, as adding cognitive

load should further reduce situational indecisiveness when

combined with

a

frame.

Participants given

a

positively or

negatively framed problem and put under cognitive load
should show

a

greater decrease in situational

indecisiveness than participants given the same frame who
are under no cognitive load.

A main effect of dispositional indecisiveness on

situational indecisiveness is predicted^, as people who

generally experience difficulty making decisions should
report greater difficulty making my decisions.

In

addition, as people who experience difficulty making
19

decisions may be more inclined to use any
available bias
than those who do not experience generalized
difficulty in

decision-making,

a

Frame x Dispositional indecisiveness

interaction is expected.

Participants given

are disposit ionally indecisive should show

a

a

frame who

greater

reduction in situational indecisiveness than
participants
given a frame who are not dispositionally indecisive.

Need

for cognition may interact with problem framing, by
either

magnifying or diminishing the proposed reduction in
situational indecisiveness resulting from reliance on the

problem frame.
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CHAPTER

2

METHOD

Overview

Participants considered two decision scenarios,
one
required

choice between two potential roommates differing

a

in number of features used to describe each;

required

decision to add or drop

a

a

the other

hypothetical course.

Both scenarios were framed in one of three ways: positive,
negative, or neutral

always the same)

(the frame for both scenarios was

The first scenario of each packet was

.

presented under high cognitive load while the second

problem was presented without cognitive load.

Participants

considered decision relevant information before making the
decision and then rated decision difficulty on
seven point scales.

In addition,

cognitive bias were obtained.
a

a

series of

several measures of

Participants also completed

six-item version of Frost and Gross's (1993)

Indecisiveness Scale and
and Petty'

s

a

five-item version of Cacioppo

Need for Cognition Scale.

(1984)

Presentation

order for each scenario (course and roommate) and potential

roommate

(enriched,

counterbalanced.

or 9/9 and unenriched,

or 3/3)

was

All subjects were randomly assigned to

21

.

frame and cognitive load conditions in

a

3

x 2

experimental

design

Participants

Ninety undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses
at the University of Massachusetts Amherst
participated in

this study.

Participants completed questionnaires in small

groups and received course credit for their participation.

Participants ranged in age from

to 38

17

(M

= 20.3).

Twenty-two were male (24.4%), sixty-seven were female
(74.4%),

and one did not report gender.

Materials

Frame Manipulation

The two scenarios were framed in three different ways:

positive, neutral, and negative.

In the positive frame,

the problem was worded in a way to bias the subject to

attend to positive information in making the decision.

In

the roommate problem, participants decided which person

they would accept as their roommate, and in the course
problem, participants decided if they would add the course
22

to their schedule.

worded

m

a

In the negative frame,

the problem was

way to bias the participant to attend
to

negative information.

In the roormnate problem,

participants decided which person they would
reject as
their roommate, while in the course problem
they were asked
if they would drop the course from their
schedule.

neutral frame, the problem was worded in

a

In the

way that made

the positive and negative features equally salient.

In the

roommate problem participants identified which of the two

potential roommates they would accept and which they would
reject,

while in the course problem they decided if they

would add or drop the course.

Participants received the

same frame for both scenarios.

listed in Appendix A and

Frame manipulations are

B.

Cognitive Load Manipulation

Participants experienced cognitive load during the
scenario presented first in the questionnaire packet only.
They were told this would mimic the distractions inherent
in everyday decision-making and were asked to mentally

rehearse and remember an eight-digit number during exposure
to the problem information,

framing manipulation.

immediately following the

They were asked to recall the number
23

before making their decision, so that
cognitive load

existed only for exposure to the information,
and not
during exposure to the framing manipulation
or while they
made their decision.

Participants experienced cognitive

load only for the scenario presented first in
their packet

Problem Information

Pursuing the question of whether framing can make

decision making easier required

a

situation with some

degree of difficulty, which is not usually done in this
research area.
simple and easy,
effort.

Most problems used in similar contexts are

requiring little thought or cognitive

In my attempt to construct a difficult

hypothetical decision,

I

came to question whether any

hypothetical decision can be truly difficult.

I

addressed

this by trying to make the problems personally involving

and relevant to undergraduates

(dealing with roommates and

course selection) and by introducing cognitive load as

a

distraction to make the decision more difficult.
Additionally,

I

tried to design

a

highly conflicted

situation by balancing the number and intensity of positive
and negative features.

The valence of the decision

relevant information given for each scenario was
24

ambivalent.

The information given

m

each problem was

pilot tested to ensure that undergraduates
indeed perceived
each set of information as ambivalent.
Two combinations of traits selected
from Anderson's
(1968)

compilation of likableness ratings were used for
the

roommate scenario.

One set consisted of six traits, three

moderately positive (friendly, energetic, and interesting)
and three moderately negative (forgetful, restless,
and

withdrawn)

The second set of traits consisted of eighteen

.

additional traits, nine moderately positive and nine

moderately negative.
Characteristics used in the course problem were

constructed by the experimenters and consisted of twenty
features,

ten positive

innovative)
and boring)

(e.g.,

and ten negative
.

inspiring, enjoyable, and
(e.g.,

tedious,

unorganized,

See Appendix C for a complete list of the

traits and characteristics used.

Measures

Dependent Variable Measures

Decision.

Participants indicated their decision for

the course problem (adding the course was coded as "1";

25
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.

dropping the course was coded as "2")
and for the roommate

problem (deciding to room with the 3/3
roommate was coded
as "1";

deciding to room with the 9/9 roommate was
coded as

S ituational

Indecisiveness

After indicating their

decision, participants completed several questions

assessing situational indecisiveness

,

or the overall

difficulty experienced in making the decision.

These

included ratings of confidence, hesitation, certainty, and

difficulty encountered in making the decision.
were indicated on seven-point scales.

Ratings

Individual scales

were scored so that higher scores on situational

indecisiveness are indicative of more indecisiveness

Bias Measures

Feature Listing Bias.

After making each decision,

participants listed the traits or characteristics that came
to mind while they were considering the decision problem.

After completing the listing task, they identified each
listed attribute as positive or negative, and rated on

a

ten point scale how important each was in making the

decision.

This assessed the presence and extent of bias in
26

accessible beliefs as introduced by the
problem framing.
Positively biased participants should list
more positive
traits,

and report them as more important in
making the

decision than negative traits.

Conversely, negatively

biased participants should list more features that
are
negative and give them more weight than the positive
features.

The listing bias was computed as the number
of

negative features listed subtracted from the number of

positive features listed.

Recognition Bias.
recognition task.

Participants also completed

They viewed

a

list of features,

a

half of

which were the actual features presented as information in
the problem scenario and half of which were filler

features.

Participants then identified the characteristics

that had described the potential roommate or course.

The

list contained 48 traits for the roommate scenario and 40

characteristics for the course scenario.

Participants

should choose features consistent with the framing bias

more frequently than inconsistent features.

This variable

was computed as the number of negative features chosen

subtracted from the number of positive features chosen.
All features recognized were included in analysis
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regardless of whether they were actually
used

descriptions

Individual Difference Measures

Participants completed

a

measure of dispositional

indecisiveness (adapted from Frost
&

Shows,

1993)

Sample items include

.

make decisions and

I

(adapted from Cacioppo

Denes-Raj

&

I

1993,

in Frost

find it easy to

usually make decisions quickly.

Participants also completed

Pacini,

Gross,

&

&

a

measure of need for cognition

Petty,

Heier,

1996)

1984;
.

Sample items include

prefer complex to simple problems and
thinking in depth about something.

reported in Epstein,

I

I

try to avoid

Items were selected

based on high reliabilities on prescreen and pilot tests.
The complete scales used are listed in Appendix

D.

The abbreviated Indecisiveness Scale was previously

used during a large prescreen session (n= 398) and in pilot
studies

(n= 73)

.75 and

.96,

and proved to be reliable

respectively).

(Cronbach's Alpha

Epstein et al.

(1996)

reported

the abbreviated Need for Cognition Scale to be internally

consistent (Cronbach's Alpha .73).

Reliability

coefficients for the Need for Cognition and Indecisiveness
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scales in this study were similar to
those previously

reported

(a =

.75 and

.81),

Reactive Effects

To check for demand characteristics participants'

perception of the purpose and hypotheses of the experiment
were solicited, and they were asked if they felt any

expectations to respond in

a

particular way.

There was no

evidence of demand characteristics in this study.

To

further control for demand characteristics, the

experimenters were blind to the experimental condition of
any individual participant and read all instructions to

participants from

a

script.

Additionally,

some items were

worded for reverse scoring to minimize the response bias of
acquiescence.

To further mitigate response bias,

the

instructions made clear that there were no correct or
incorrect answers to these problems and that all responses
were to be kept anonymous.

Following completion of the

questionnaire participants were thanked and debriefed.
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3

RESULTS

Analysis

Data analysis incorporated univariate analysis
of

variance (ANOVA) to identify differences between
frame and
cognitive load conditions.

Regression and correlation

analyses were used to identify the relationship between

participant's need for cognition and indecisiveness scores
and reported decisional difficulty, as well as to determin
the presence and direction of processing bias.

Analyses

are reported separately for each scenario.

Decision

The majority of participants dropped the course
(57.8%)

and decided to room with the 9/9 roommate

(80%).

Participants in the neutral (no frame) condition should
have been equally likely to add or drop the course and
This was found for the

accept or reject the roommate,,

course problem (fifty percent of participants in the

neutral frame added the course) but not for the roommate

problem (83.3% chose to room with the 9/9 roommate).
30

Framing Effects

Analysis of participant's decisions did not replicate
the previously reported effects of framing on
decisions.

ANOVA's of decisions did not reach significance for either
the course
(F2,89 =

.61,

(F2,89=

.14,

p<.54).

p<.56)

or the roommate scenario

Participants were somewhat more likely

to drop the course under the positive and negative frames

1.63 and 1.60)

(Ms =

1.50).

than under the neutral frame

In the roommate scenario,

(M

=

participants made the

same decision under the positive and neutral frame

(choosing to room with the 9/9 roommate, Ms = 1.83 for both
frames)

but under the negative frame participants were

somewhat less likely to choose the 9/9 roommate

(M =

1.73).

None of these differences, however, reached statistical
levels of significance.

Dispositional Indecisiveness

Regression analysis revealed that dispositional

indecisiveness was not

a

significant predictor of

31

participants' decision for either the course
p<.37)

or the roommate

(R =

.08,

(R =

.10,

p<.44).

Need for Cognition

Although there were no specific hypothesis concerning
the influence of need for cognition on decision, regression

analysis revealed that need for cognition was

predictor of decision for the course
not for the roommate

(R =

.05,

(R =

p<.63).

.48,

significant

a

p<.00)

Participants low in

need for cognition were likely to drop the course
1.80)

but

(M =

while participants high in need for cognition were

likely to add the course
condition.

(M =

regardless of frame

1.25)

There was little difference in the decisions of

low and high need for cognition participants in the

roommate scenario

(Ms = 1.83 and 1.75,

n.s.).

Frame by Need for Cognition Interaction

Analysis of variance revealed

a

marginally significant

Frame x Need for cognition interaction (using

a

split of participants need for cognition scores)

course decision

(Fi, 84=2.

63,

p<.08).

median
for the

Participants low in

need for cognition were less likely to drop the course in
32
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the positive and negative frame than
in the neutral, while

participants high

m

need for cognition were less likely
to

add the course in the positive and negative
frames than in
the neutral frame

(see Figure 1).

Low need for cognition

participants in the neutral frame tended to drop
the course
(M =

1.93)

while high need for cognition participants
in

the neutral frame tended to add the course

(M =

1,13).

There was no significant frame by need for cognition

interaction for the roommate decision.

There was

a

trend

for participants high need for cognition to exhibit the

expected framing effect of choosing the 9/9 roommate in the
positive frame and rejecting the 9/9 roommate in the
negative frame, but this was not significant (F2,5i=
p<. 39)

.96,

.

Situational Indecisiveness

Scores on the six measures of situational

indecisiveness

(certainty, difficulty, etc.)

were summed

to indicate participant's reported situational

indecisiveness.

Scale reliability was high for both

scenarios, a = .87 for the course and a = .86 for the

roommate
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Framing Effects

Analysis of frame on situational indecisiveness

revealed

a

scenarios.

trend in the predicted direction for both
Participants in the positive and in the

negative frame conditions reported less difficulty
making
the decision than participants in the neutral frame

condition.

While in the predicted direction, this effect

was not significant

(for the roorrmate:

with frame M =

22.57, without frame M = 25.23, difference = 2.67,
=2.46,

p<.12, mean for the course: with frame M = 22.02,

without frame M = 23.47, difference = 1.45,
p<.41)

Fi,89

Fi^gg =

.68,

.

Cognitive Load

Analysis revealed

a

marginally significant main effect

of cognitive load on reported difficulty in the roommate

scenario only

(Fi,88 =

3.33,

p<.07)

.

The effect was in the

same direction for the course scenario, although it did not

approach significance

(Fi,88 =

-

40,

p<.53).

Results were

contrary to the initial prediction that participants under
cognitive load would report greater situational

indecisiveness than those not under cognitive load.
34

Results indicate that cognitive load had
the opposite
effect than was predicted; participants
reported less

difficulty when under cognitive load than when
not under
cognitive load.

In retrospect,

this result is not

inconsistent with my analysis- cognitive load may
prevent

deliberation and encourage superficial processing, which
in
fact would make the decision easier.

Frame by Cognitive Load Interaction

A Frame x Cognitive load interaction was expected on

decisional difficulty.

Participants were predicted to

report less difficulty when given

a

frame than when not,

and this difference should be greater for participants

under cognitive load than for those not under cognitive
load.

The roommate scenario did not provide evidence of

a

frame by cognitive load interaction whereas the course

scenario did, but the interaction did not reach statistical
significance.

The reduction of indecisiveness by problem

framing was in the predicted direction for the course but
the effects of cognitive load were opposite to what was

expected in the roommate scenario and did not reach
statistical significance for either.
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In the roommate scenario,

participants reported the

most difficulty making the decision
without

a

frame

(neutral condition, M = 27.40) than with
a frame
or negative, M = 23.67)
load.

(positive

when they were not under cognitive

This is consistent with the finding that

participants found decisions more difficult without
cognitive load.

Participants under cognitive load also

reported more difficulty making the decision without
frame

(M = 23.07)

than with

a

frame

(M =

a

21.27), but the

reduction of indecisiveness associated with frame was
greater for participants not under cognitive load (see
Figure

2

)

.

Participants in the course scenario also reported more

difficulty in the neutral/no frame condition
than in the frame condition

(M =

20.70)

(M =

24.53)

when under

cognitive load, but reported slightly more difficulty in
the frame condition

(M =

23.33)

than in the no frame

condition (22.40) when not under cognitive load.

Dispositional Indecisiveness

Participants high on dispositional indecisiveness

reported more difficulty making both decisions.
analysis showed that indecisiveness was
36

a

Regression

significant

predictor of situational indecisiveness
p <

.026 for course,

roommate).

R =

.29,

R^ =

.08,

Further analysis using

a

(R =

p <

=

.24,

.06,

.005 for

median split of

participants' indecisiveness scores showed that
the low and
high indecisiveness groups differed significantly
for the

roommate problem only
p <

.28

(Fi,

gg

= 7.70,

for course problem).

p <.01 vs.

Fi,

88= 1.18,

Highly indecisive

participants reported more difficulty making the roommate
decision while decisive participants rated the scenarios

approximately equal in difficulty.

Need for Cognition

There were only small relationships between need for

cognition and situational indecisiveness
for the course and R = .04, n.s.

(R =

.15,

p<.15

for the roommate).

Participants low in need for cognition reported slightly
more difficulty than did participants high in need for

cognition for both scenarios.

This trend did not attain

statistical significance, however.
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Bias

Correlation Between Bias and Decisions

Feature Listing Bias.

Feature listing was

significantly correlated with decision for the course
.61,

p<.00).

(r

=

Adding the course was associated with listing

more positive features about the course and dropping the
course was associated with listing more negative features
about the course.

Feature listing across both roommates was uncorrelated

with decision, but analysis for features listed for the 3/3
and 9/9 roommates separately revealed significant

correlations between feature listing and decision.
with the 3/3 roommate was associated with
listing for the 3/3 roommate

(r

=

.21,

a

Rooming

more positive

p<.05).

Likewise,

choosing to room with the 9/9 was associated with

positive feature listing bias for the 9/9 roommate
,31,

more

a

(r

=

p<. 00)

Further analysis of the roommate bias revealed that
for participants under cognitive load,

feature listing bias

was significantly correlated with decision for both

roommates
p<.03)

(for 3/3,

r =

.40,

p<.01; for 9/9,

r =

.33,

but for participants under no cognitive load,
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listing bias was only marginally correlated
with decision
for the 9/9 roommate

(r

=

.23,

p<„l4)

correlated for the 3/3 roommate

(r

=

and not at all
.04,

p<.78).

This

suggests that cognitive load may strengthen the

relationship between processing bias and decision.
However,

there was no interaction between cognitive load

and feature listing bias for the course scenario.

Feature Recognition Bias.

Feature recognition was

significantly correlated with decision for the course
scenario

(r

=

.32,

Adding the course was

p<.00).

associated with recognizing more features that were
positive and dropping the course was associated with

recognizing more features that were negative.
Recognition bias across both roommates was uncorelated
with decision.

Further analysis of each roommate

separately failed to find

a

relationship between feature

recognition and decision.
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Framing Effects

Neutral Frame.
less bias

(i.e.,

Participants in both scenarios showed

scores were closer to zero on the

measurement scale) in the neutral frame than in the
positive or negative frames (means are presented in Table
1)

.

In the course scenario,

this trend was marginally

significant for the feature listing bias (F2,85= 2.58,
p<.08),

bias

but not significant for the feature recognition

(F2,87

=

.10,

n.s,).

In the roommate scenario,

trend was not significant for recognition bias

the

(F2,87 =

1

.

82

,

p<.70), and there was no difference between frames for

listing bias

(F2,86 =

-

20

,

p<.82).

Further analysis for each potential roommate

separately revealed the same trend for listing and

recognition bias: Participants reported the most neutral
bias in the neutral frame condition.

This was significant

only for recognition bias for the 9/9 roommate,

F2,87 =

2

.

66,

p<. 08

Positive and Negative Frames.

There was no systemic

bias resulting from the positive or negative frames.

In

the roommate problem, participants were equally biased

under the positive and negative frames for recognition bias
40
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(Ms =

1.63),

but for feature listing, participants
reported

the most positive bias under the negative
frame

(M =

1.20)

and the least positive bias under the positive
frame
.70).

In the course problem,

(M =

participants reported the

most negative bias under the positive and negative
frames
on both feature listing

(Ms = -1.40 and -.80)

recognition measures of bias

and feature

(Ms = -.66 and -.67).

Participants reported the most negative bias under the

positive frame for both feature listing and recognition.

Cognitive Load

There were significant main effects of cognitive load
on both feature listing bias

recognition bias

(Fi,i64 =

(Fi,i64= 4.00,

4.93,

p<.05)

participants across both scenarios.

p<.03)

and

for all 180

Regardless of framing

condition, participants under cognitive load were more

positively biased than participants not under cognitive
load

(see Table

2

for means)

Further analysis for each scenario separately revealed
that participants reported significantly more positive bias
on both the listing and recognition

(Ms =

1.96 and 1.89)

the roommate scenario when under cognitive load than when
not under cognitive load

(Ms = -.02

41

and -.31;

Fi,87

= 9.83,

in

p<.002,

and

Fi,88 =

4„04,

p<.048)„

In the course scenario,

participants under cognitive load showed more positive
bias
for feature recognition than participants not
under

cognitive load (Ms = -,21 vs. -.96), but showed little

difference on feature listing bias

(Ms = -.70 vs.

-.64).

Neither measure of bias differed significantly by cognitive
load for the course scenario.

Manipulation and Validity Checks

Demand Characteristics

No participant correctly identified the purpose of

this study or the major variables under investigation.

A

few participants reported that they were expected to

provide certain answers but further reading of their
responses indicated that it is likely they were referring
to being required to make a response,

response.

and not any specific

Based on the responses to these questions it is

assumed that demand characteristics were not
this research.
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a

problem in

.

Problem Framing

If people are more accustomed to
and therefore expect

positively framed information (Smith
might automatically rephrase
framed problem into
this,

a

Petty,

&

1996),

negatively or neutrally

positively framed question.

a

they

To check

participants reported if they rephrased the question

they were asked.

Participants reported rephrasing most

often in the negative frame for both scenarios (33.3% for
the course,

30% for the roommate)

Additionally, to see if participants could identify
their frame after completion of the questionnaire, they

were

asked to restate the decision they had made.

Two

coders judged whether participants correctly or incorrectly

identified their frame condition.
frame in their response,

identification.
I

If participants used the

it was coded as a correct

For example,

"I

had to decide which person

would accept as my roommate" was coded as

identification for

a

participant in

a

a

correct

positive frame (but

would have been coded as incorrect for participants in
neutral or negative frame)
also coded as correct.

.

a

Frame consistent synonyms were

For example,

"I

was asked if

I

would sign-up for this course" was coded as correct for

participants in the positive frame (but again would be
43
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,

coded as incorrect for participants
in

a

neutral or

negative frame)
More participants misidentif ied their
frame for the
course

than did for the roommate (26„7%)„

(43„3%)

Negative

frames were misidentif ied more often than
neutral or

positive frames for both scenarios.

For the course

problem, the frame that was misidentif ied the most
often
was the negative frame

positive frame
36.7%).

(n

=

(n =

13,

15,

43.3%)

50%)

followed by the

and then neutral

= 11,

(n

For the roommate problem the negative frame was

again misidentif ied most frequently

(n

= 10,

followed by the positive and neutral frames

33.3%)
(n =

7,

23.3%

for both)

ANOVA revealed Frame
this measure

(see Figure

for the course,

x Cognitive load interactions on
3)

F2,84= 6,37,

This was highly significant

.

p<.00; and marginally

significant for the roommate,

F2,83

= 2.74,

p<.07.

In the

course scenario participants under cognitive load

misidentif ied their frame most in the neutral condition
= 9,

60%),

while participants not under cognitive load

misidentif ied the frame the least for the neutral frame
= 2,

(n

13.3%).

In the roommate scenario the opposite

occurred, the neutral frame was misidentif ied most in no
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(n

cognitive load condition

(n

= 6,

40%)

and the least by

participants under cognitive load (n=l, 6.7%),

Cognitive Load

To induce cognitive load, participants remembered
an

eight-digit number.

The average number of digits

remembered correctly was

7,77,

This indicates that

participants attended to the manipulation and did rehearse
the number to themselves.

Eighty-three of the ninety

participants (92%) remembered all eight digits correctly.
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4

DISCUSSION
This study was

a

first attempt to examine decisional

difficulty, or situational indecisiveness
of biases in decision making^

,

in the context

Previous research has shown

that framing often influences preferences, but

I

wanted to

know if it made the decision conflict easier to resolve.
Data suggest that framing did reduce indecision in

decision-making, but the

statistical significance.

effects failed to reach
The present study was also

unable to obtain the predicted framing effects on decision
making.

The decisions revealed no systemic effects of

adding the course or accepting the 9/9 roommate under

a

positive frame versus dropping the course or rejecting the
9/9 roommate under a negative frame.

Cognitive load was

predicted to make decision-making more difficult but data
reveal that cognitive load apparently reduces indecision
and difficulty overall.
frame and scenario,

Cognitive load interacted with

resulting in greater reduction of

indecision caused by framing for the roommate scenario
while the reduction of indecision caused by framing was
less for the course.

Need for cognition showed no

significant relation to situational indecisiveness

,

whereas

dispositional indecisiveness correlated with situational
46

.

indecisiveness.

Thought listing valence revealed bias in

the direction of the decision for both
scenarios, but

recognition bias correlated with decision only
for the
course.
bias,

Positive or negative frames did not influence

but participants were more neutral on
measures of

bias when given

a

neutral frame.

Participants under

cognitive load were more positively biased, this was
significant for the roommate scenario.

Overall,

results

were weaker than expected, inconsistent across scenarios,
and failed to replicate previously reported framing

effects
The results of this study are difficult to interpret
for several reasons.

First,

the results unexpectedly

differed across scenarios, preventing generalization across
problems.

This may be due to the roommate problem

involving person perception, which may require

a

different

process than decision-making concerning other topics.

In

addition, the problems consisted of different types of

decision outcomes.

The course involved

a

single choice,

add or drop the course, whereas the roommate involved

a

choice between alternatives, to decide which of two

potential roommates to accept or reject.
Second, despite repeated pilot testing, the data did

not exhibit the hypothesized framing effects.
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This

to

indicates that framing effects are more
complex and less
stable than originally assumed.

This prevented a

meaningful test of the predicted interactions.
Unexpected results from negative frames may be
explained by previous research, but little is available
to
explain unexpected results in the positive frame.

For

example, negative frames are processed more carefully than

positive frames (Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch,
Lockhart,

1998;

Smith

&

Petty,

1996)

.

&

Therefore,

negatively framed decision-makers may be less susceptible
to contextual or peripheral cues than positively framed

decision-makers.

This may explain in part why participants

mean decision scores never dropped below the midpoint of
the decision coding

(1.5 on a scale from

of a lack of negativity bias)

1

to 2;

indicative

but cannot account for

positively framed participants deviating more than
negatively framed participants from the expected decisions.
Alternatively, negatively valenced information has
been shown to receive more weight in person perception and

decision-making (Fiske, 1980; Tykocinski, Higgins,
Chaiken,

1994),

&

and therefore negative information may

weigh more heavily in decisions than positive information,
even in

a

positive frame.

This could explain in part why
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positively framed participants deviated
more from the
expected decisions than did negatively
framed participants.
It is possible that framing effects
were not observed

due to the more complex structural nature
of the decision

problems.

The situations used were more complex
than those

traditionally used to study framing effects.

Most framing

problems are simple, short, and uninvolving, with
options

containing few pieces of information.
Ganzach and Schul

'

one of

framing problems included two

(1995)

s

For example,

positive features and two negative features describing
potential roommate.

Participants then marked on

a

a

seven

point scale their "tendency to accept (or reject) the

described individual as

roommate".

a

framing problems involving
lotteries:

a

lottery with

a
a

Shafir (1993) used

simple choice between two
50% chance of winning $50,

lottery with an 80% chance of winning $150 and
of losing $10.

a

or a

20% chance

Smith and Levin (1996) also used framing

problems requiring

a

simple choice between two treatment

alternatives each described by one brief sentence.
In addition,

the problems involved

course scenario) and

judgment

(in the

choice between riskless options

a

the roommate scenario)

a

.

Many framing problems in the

literature involve choice between risky alternatives.
Indeed,

larger framing effect sizes are associated with
49

(in

.

choice involving risky alternatives
(Kuhberger, 1998).

There are many plausible interpretations
of why the problem
frames did not result in the expected framing
effects

No

„

one explanation discussed, however, can account
for the

inconsistent pattern of framing effects uncovered.

A hypothesis of this study was that adding cognitive
load to

a

decision would increase the difficulty associated

with resolving that decision.
opposite,

Analysis revealed just the

that cognitive load decreased the difficulty

associated with making

a

decision.

This indicates that

inhibiting deliberation reduces indecision and difficulty.
While this contradicts the original hypothesis, post hoc

deliberation of these findings makes sense and suggests
that this pattern of results is actually
not initially obvious)

a

reasonable (if

outcome.

Dispositional indecisiveness and situational

indecisiveness were significantly correlated.

This

relationship was theoretically expected and validated the
measures of both dispositional and situational
indecisiveness
A tentative hypothesis predicted

a

relationship

between need for cognition and situational indecisiveness,
but did not specify the direction of that relation.

there

was no significant relation between need for
50

While

cognition and situational indecisiveness

,

participants

high in need for cognition reported slightly
less

difficulty than did participants low in need for
cognition.
This suggests that being high in need for
cognition may be

related to less difficulty in decision-making.
Additionally, need for cognition was significantly related
to decision for the course,

but not for the roommate.

Participants high in need for cognition added the course
while participants low in need for cognition dropped the
course,

regardless of frame.

This suggests that features

used in the description of the course may have been more

appealing to individuals high in need for cognition than to

participants low in need for cognition.
A possible threat to external validity is the

assumption that

a

hypothetical decision problem can be used

to examine decision-making processes used in real life.

Difficult decisions made in everyday life are not

hypothetical and may generally be more complex than any
hypothetical problem used in research settings.
this issue,

To address

the problems used in this research were

constructed to be as complex as is possible for

questionnaire format.

In addition,

my participant

population consisted exclusively of undergraduates.

This

is typical in social psychological research however,

and
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there are generally no major problems
generalizing the

results of such research to other populations.
Several aspects of the proposed results warrant

further research.

It is apparent that framing effects are

not as stable or consistent as assumed.

The contextual and

dispositional factors determining the presence of framing
need to be explored further.

If problem framing can be

shown to reduce indecisiveness with statistical

significance, then it is

a

useful tool for decision-makers

and ways in which to apply this to

a

variety of settings

and types of decisions should be explored.

appeared to reduce indecisiveness.

Cognitive load

Future research may

explore the effects of different levels of distraction on
indecisiveness, as well as the possible applications and

limitations of this effect.

Additional biases that may

reduce indecisiveness also warrant investigation, including
mood, priming and directed thinking.
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Figure 1.
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Figure 2.
Situational Indecisiveness by frame and
cognitive
load for course and roommate problem.
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Figure 3.
Participants frame identification by frame
and
cognitive load.
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APPENDIX A
FRAME MANIPULATION FOR COURSE PROBLEM
It is the beginning of the semester.
You have
preregistered for a number of courses but have not
yet

finalized your schedule.

Positive Frame Among other things, you are
considering adding an elective course for which you
have
not yet signed up.
:

Negative Frame Among other things, you are
considering dropping an elective course for which you have
already signed up.
:

Neutral Frame Among other things, you are still
considering whether you should or should not take a
particular elective course.
:

You will base your decision whether or not to
include this course on your schedule on information about
the course that you found in a course guide prepared by
undergraduates.
This guide summarizes evaluations and
comments from students who have taken the same course in
the past with the same instructor.

(cognitive load, if applicable went here)

Positive Frame Based on the following information,
you must decide if you would add this course to your
schedule
:

Negative Frame Based on the following information,
you must decide if you would drop this course from your
schedule
:

Neutral Frame Based on the following information, you
must decide whether you would or would not include this
course in your schedule.
:

(description of the elective course came here)
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APPENDIX B
FRAME MANIPULATION FOR ROOMMATE
PROBLEM

Imagine that you paid a security deposit
on a very
nice off-campus apartment.
However, you now learn that the
person who was to share the apartment with you
will not be
coming back to UMass.
You cannot afford to rent the
apartment without a roommate and, if you don't
find one
you lose your security deposit and will have
to look for
another place to live.
Fortunately, it is still early and
there are many students who have yet to finalize
their
living arrangements for the academic year.

Positive Frame: Your main concern is to make sure that
you accept a roommate who is right for you.

Negative Frame Your main concern is to make sure that
you reject a roommate who is wrong for you.
:

Neutral Frame
decision

Your main concern is to make the right

:

After searching for a day or two, you learn of two
individuals interested in sharing your apartment and you
acquire some information about them.
(cognitive load, if applicable went here.)

Positive Frame On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which individual to accept as
your roommate.
:

Negative Frame On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which individual to reject as
your roommate.
:

Neutral Frame On the basis of the following
information, you must decide which person to accept and
which person to reject as your roommate.
:

(descriptions of the two roommates came here)
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APPENDIX C

TRAITS USED IN ROOMMATE PROBLEM AND FEATURES
USED TO
DESCRIBE COURSE
Traits used to describe
3/3 roommate:
friendly
energetic
interesting
forgetful
restless
withdrawn

Traits used to describe 9/9
roommate
confident
materialistic
sarcastic
kind
tense
sincere
cunning
open-minded
critical
neat
opinionated
creative
obstinate
cheerful
interesting
educated
strict
immature

Characteristics used to describe the course
work intensive
thought -provoking
tedious
inspiring
difficult
interactive
dry
formal
challenging
hands-on
en j oyable
demanding
boring
unorganized
interesting

unnecessary
worthwhile
innovative
uninspiring
educational
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APPENDIX

D

DISPOSITIONAL INDECISIVENESS AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Indecisiveness Scale
Adapted from Frost and Gross (1993), in Frost and Shows
(1993)

always know exactly what I want.
2. I find it easy to make decisions.
3. I have a hard time planning my free time.
4. When ordering from a menu I usually find it difficult
to decide what to get.
5. I usually make decisions quickly,
6. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes
me a long time.
Items 1, 2 and 5 were reverse scored.
1. I

Need for cognition Scale
Petty and Cacioppo (1984), as adapted in Epstein, et al
(1996)

don't like that I have to do a lot of thinking.
2. I prefer complex to simple problems.
3. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in
depth about something.
4. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking
abilities rather than
something that requires little thought.
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something
gives me little satisfaction.
Items If 3 and 5 were reverse scored.
1. I
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